Rules by Decree or Emergent Rules
Elinor Ostrom has devoted a substantial portion of her career to understanding how individuals overcome the “tragedy of the commons.” Her research has spawned a large and ever growing literature that examines how private individuals overcome collective action problems without state intervention. Her latest book, Understanding Institutional Diversity, presents plenty of evidence that supports her approach. It is worth the read.
Richard Wagner’s forthcoming review (in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization) raises an important issue largely ignored by Ostrom and many fellow New Institutional Economists. She accepts the definition of institutions as the rules of the game. Professor Wagner writes that “The danger in thinking of institutions as rules of the game is to think that legislation can serve directly as an instrument to change societal outcomes in some intended manner.” Implicitly institutions as rules of the game skews the analysis in favor small scale state planning. It biases policy proposals. It ignores that people do not respond like automatons. Sometimes they ignore rule changes and maintain their behavior (consider the effects of Prohibition, as Professor Wagner). A more fruitful approach views are "articulated descriptions of conduct." That is, rules emerge from social interaction rather than by decree. The latter approach has a place in Ostrom's framework. Hopefully, future research will pursue this agenda,